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Abstract 
 
Naïve observers typically perceive some groupings for a set of stimuli as more 
intuitive than others. The problem of predicting category intuitiveness has been 
historically considered the remit of models of unsupervised categorization. In 
contrast, this paper develops a measure of category intuitiveness from one of the most 
widely supported models of supervised categorization, the Generalized Context 
Model (GCM). Considering different category assignments for a set of instances, we 
ask how well the GCM can predict the classification of each instance on the basis of 
all the other instances. The category assignment that results in the smallest prediction 
error is interpreted as the most intuitive for the GCM—we call this way of applying 
the GCM unsupervised GCM. The paper then systematically compares predictions of 
category intuitiveness from the unsupervised GCM and two models of unsupervised 
categorization, the simplicity model and the rational model. We found that the 
unsupervised GCM compares favorably to the simplicity model and rational model. 
This success of the unsupervised GCM illustrates that the distinction between 
supervised and unsupervised categorization may have to be reconsidered. However, 
no model emerges as clearly superior, indicating that there is more work to be done in 
understanding and modeling category intuitiveness.  
 
Keywords: supervised categorization, unsupervised categorization, exemplar theory, 
GCM.  
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Introduction 
The distinction between supervised and unsupervised categorization has been central 
to the development of categorization theory in cognitive science. Supervised 
categorization concerns predicting how novel instances will be classified, with respect 
to a set of existing categories; such predictions can be typically carried out with 
impressive accuracy. Prominent classes of supervised categorization models include  
the exemplar theory (Medin & Schaffer, 1978; Nosofsky, 1988; Van Vanpaemel & 
Storms, 2008), prototype theory (Hampton, 2000; Minda & Smith, 2000; Posner & 
Keele, 1968), and the general recognition theory (Ashby & Perrin, 1988). Supervised 
categorization typically involves training procedures with corrective feedback. By 
contrast, in a typical unsupervised categorization experiment participants are asked to 
divide some stimuli into categories which are intuitive, without any corrective 
feedback.  
Interest in unsupervised categorization largely originates from the notion of 
category coherence (Murphy & Medin, 1985). Why do certain groupings of objects 
form psychologically intuitive categories, but other groupings are nonsensical? For 
example, most cultures have concepts such as happiness or animal. By contrast, a 
grouping which includes the Eiffel Tower, children under five, and apples would be 
considered entirely nonsensical. Murphy and Medin (1985) suggested that a category 
is coherent if it fits well with our overall understanding of the world; they argued that 
explanations based on similarity are inadequate (cf. Heit, 1997; Lewandowsky, 
Roberts, & Yang, 2006; Wisniewski, 1995). Unfortunately, creating categorization 
models on the basis of general knowledge is extremely difficult (e.g., Fodor, 1983; 
Pickering & Chater, 1995; but see Griffiths, Steyvers, & Tenenbaum, 2007 or 
Tenenbaum, Griffiths, & Kemp, 2006). Moreover, there is empirical evidence that 
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people do use similarity in unsupervised categorization, at least in some cases.  
Accordingly, some researchers have developed unsupervised categorization models 
which are based on similarity (e.g., Compton & Logan, 1993; Love, Medin, & 
Gureckis, 2004; Milton & Wills, 2004; Pothos & Chater, 2002).  
 Unsupervised categorization involves two slightly separate problems: first, 
identifying the classification for a set of stimuli, which would be preferred by naïve 
observers. For example, in Figure 1, the preferred classifications for the dots are the 
ones indicated by the continuous curves (here and elsewhere, points represent objects 
and the axes are assumed to correspond to dimensions of some putative internal 
mental space; similarities are inversely related to distances). A second problem in 
unsupervised categorization is, given a classification for a stimulus set and another for 
a different stimulus set, deciding which one is more intuitive. In Figure 1, the 
classification on top should be perceived as more intuitive compared to the 
classification in the bottom panel (this is because the difference of within- versus 
between-category similarity in the top panel is higher than in the bottom; Pothos & 
Chater, 2002). In other words, if real stimuli are created after the Figure 1 points, 
participants are likely to identify the top classification as preferred more frequently 
and with more confidence, compared to the bottom classification. In principle, a 
model of category intuitiveness provides the basis for a model of unsupervised 
categorization, under the assumption that the most intuitive categorization will also be 
the preferred one. 
--------------------------------------FIGURE 1-------------------------------------- 
 A main objective of this work is to examine predictions of category 
intuitiveness from computational models of unsupervised categorization, for a range 
of stimulus sets. As far as we are aware, there has been no systematic investigation of 
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this kind. This is an important shortcoming, given the strong intuitions we can have 
about which categorizations are more intuitive than others. We consider category 
intuitiveness predictions from the rational model (Anderson, 1991; Sanborn, Griffiths, 
& Navarro, 2006) and the simplicity model (Pothos & Chater, 2002). The inclusion of 
these two models has been partly motivated by the fact that they can readily produce a 
measure of category intuitiveness (this is not always the case with models of 
unsupervised categorization; e.g., see Compton & Logan, 1993).  
 Unsupervised and supervised categorization have typically been assumed to 
correspond to different psychological processes and the related research traditions 
have been mostly separate. A model is typically proposed as either a model of 
supervised categorization or a model of unsupervised categorization. However, this is 
an assumption which may be inappropriate. The other main objective of this paper is 
to show that a measure of category intuitiveness can be derived from one of the best 
known models of supervised categorization, Nosofsky’s Generalized Context Model 
(GCM; Nosofsky, 1988, 1989, 1991, 1992). The version of the GCM which can 
produce predictions of category intuitiveness will be referred to as unsupervised 
GCM, to reflect the fact that, in this mode of application, the GCM assesses the 
intuitiveness of a particular classification instead of classifying new instances with 
respect to existing categories. Predictions of category intuitiveness from the GCM 
will be compared to those from the rational model and the simplicity model. 
 
Unsupervised GCM 
The GCM predicts classification probabilities for a set of test stimuli based on their 
similarity to a set of previously seen training stimuli. The GCM is described by two 
equations:  
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P(A|X) is the probability of making a category A response, given instance X (the   
terms are category biases and XA  is the sum of the similarities between X and all the 
A exemplars). This is Luce’s (1963) choice rule; it sometimes involves an exponent to 
the similarities. In equation (1b), c is a sensitivity parameter, r is a Minkowski 
distance metric parameter, q determines the shape of the similarity function, wk are 
dimensional attention weights, and y’s are item coordinates. The input to the GCM 
consists of the coordinates of a set of training stimuli, information about the 
assignment of the stimuli to categories, and the coordinates of a set of test stimuli. On 
the basis of this information, the parameters of the GCM are adjusted so as to predict 
as closely as possible empirically determined probabilities of how the test items are 
classified. An error term can be computed as 
i
i
i
P
O
O ln2 , where Oi are the target 
probabilities and Pi the predicted probabilities from the model; the summation ranges 
over all the test items. Target probabilities typically correspond to how participants 
classify test items into training categories. This equation computes a likelihood ratio 
chi-square statistic (e.g., see Hahn, Bailey, & Elvin, 2005). We refer to this error term 
as a log likelihood error term.  
 How could the GCM compute (relative) category intuitiveness? Suppose that 
in the top panel of Figure 1 we want to evaluate the intuitiveness of classification {1, 
2, 3,4, 5, 6}{7, 8, 9} versus {1, 2, 3}{4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9}. In evaluating classification {1, 
2, 3,4, 5, 6}{7, 8, 9}, we consider the GCM error term in predicting that items 1, 2, 3, 
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4, 5, 6, are in category {1, 2, 3,4, 5, 6} with 100% probability and likewise for items 
7, 8, 9 and category {7, 8, 9}. In other words, exemplars are assigned to categories in 
accordance with the category structure being evaluated and GCM fits are computed 
on this basis. A main insight in this paper is that when the GCM self-classifies a set of 
stimuli in this way, the corresponding error term can be interpreted as a measure of 
category intuitiveness. We postulate that where the error term is lower, then the 
corresponding classification is more consistent with the assumptions about 
categorization ingrained in the GCM and that, therefore, such classifications are 
considered more psychologically intuitive by the GCM. For example, self-classifying 
the Figure 1 items relative to the classification {1, 2, 3,4, 5, 6}{7, 8, 9} should be 
associated with a very small error term, as the two categories are well separated. By 
contrast, self-classification relative to {1, 2, 3}{4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9} should lead to a high 
error term. These results correspond to the obvious impression that, for the stimuli in 
Figure 1, classification {1, 2, 3,4, 5, 6}{7, 8, 9} is psychologically more intuitive than 
{1, 2, 3}{4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9}.  
This scheme constitutes a proposal for using the GCM to produce a measure 
of category intuitiveness (cf. Feldman, 2004; Pothos & Chater, 2002). We believe that 
given a measure of category intuitiveness one can create a full model of unsupervised 
categorization, but this is an objective for future work. One can ask what kind of 
category structures will be predicted as more intuitive by the GCM. For example, 
Feldman (2004) suggested that the Boolean complexity of concepts defined through 
logical expressions determines their psychological intuitiveness. Work on basic level 
categorization has assumed that category structure can be understood in terms of the 
ratio of within category similarity to between category similarity (Murphy, 1991; 
Murphy & Smith, 1982), a tradeoff in informativeness vs. specificity (Komatsu, 
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1992), or a tradeoff between cue and category validities (Jones, 1983). The 
corresponding claim for the  unsupervised GCM is that an intuitive classification will 
be possible for a set of stimuli if there are groupings which maximize within category 
similarity, both with respect to the original representation of the stimuli, and the 
various transformations for this representation allowed by the GCM parameters 
(suppression of dimensions and stretching/ compression of psychological space). This 
latter characteristic particularly distinguishes the GCM from other unsupervised 
categorization models based on similarity. The unsupervised and supervised versions 
of the GCM are based on the same equations, but applied to answer different 
questions. In the former case, the computed error term is interpreted as category 
intuitiveness, in the latter case classification probabilities of novel instances are 
predicted. Crucially, in the unsupervised GCM parameters are not adjusted to match a 
particular pattern of empirical results (parameters are determined by item coordinates, 
so that parameter search is guided by a prerogative to achieve an intuitive 
classification), while in the supervised GCM parameters are specified so as to achieve 
particular probabilities for the classification of new instances. 
So, our measure of category intuitiveness from the GCM is based on the same 
equations as the standard GCM (cf. Love, 2002). This is an important point, since it 
shows how a model which has been considered the hallmark of supervised 
categorization can be directly applied to unsupervised categorization. The specific 
details of how we applied the GCM are standard. The city block (r=1) and the 
Euclidean (r=2) metrics are the only metrics that have received psychological 
motivation, and likewise for the exponential (q=1) and Gaussian (q=2) forms of the 
similarity function. It has not been possible to motivate more specific values of r and 
q (Nosofsky, 1992), hence they were included as free parameters within these bounds. 
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Category biases were allowed to vary freely between zero and one, subject to the 
constraint that they summed to one, and likewise for the attentional weights. The 
sensitivity parameter, c, determines the extent to which the classification of an 
instance is influenced by remote exemplars or not. When c is very small, all 
exemplars will have an effect on how a test item is classified. As c increases in size, 
classification of a test item will be influenced primarily by its nearest neighbor 
amongst the training items, or, in a situation where the training items are the same as 
the test items, just by itself. This latter situation is pathological, so we required the 
unsupervised GCM to classify each stimulus on the basis of all the other stimuli in a 
stimulus set only. Given this requirement, in all our simulations the default approach 
was to allow c to vary freely between zero and infinity. We will later examine directly 
whether the unsupervised GCM can function adequately with an unrestricted c.  
 It is by no means obvious at the outset that our proposal will necessarily 
succeed. A common criticism for the GCM (and similar models) is that its parameters 
allow it too much flexibility in fitting empirical data (Olsson, Wennerholm, & 
Lyxzen, 2004; Myung, Pitt, Navarro, 2007; Navarro, 2007; Nosofsky, 2000; Nosofsky 
& Zaki, 2002; Smith, 2007; Smith &  Minda, 1998, 2000; 2002; Yang & 
Lewandowsky, 2004). Accordingly, one can wonder whether our suggestion for the 
unsupervised GCM might fail because the GCM can perfectly describe any 
assignment of stimuli into categories (regardless of whether the corresponding 
classifications are more or less intuitive). The burden is on us to demonstrate that not 
only is this not the case, but that the unsupervised GCM can perform comparably with 
established models of unsupervised categorization.  
 
Rational model  
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Many models of unsupervised categorization (including the unsupervised GCM and 
the simplicity model) rely on similarity. It is interesting to include in the comparisons 
a model that makes no explicit reference to similarity. Anderson’s (1991) rational 
model adopts a category utility approach. In other words, it assumes that categories 
are formed because they are useful to us, specifically because they allow us to infer 
unknown information about novel instances (cf. Corter & Gluck, 1992; Gosselin & 
Schyns, 2001; Jones, 1983; Medin, 1983; Murphy, 1982).  
 The rational model is an incremental, Bayesian (cf. Tenenbaum & Griffiths, 
2001; Tenenbaum, Griffiths, & Kemp, 2006) model of unsupervised categorization. It 
assigns a new stimulus with feature structure F to whichever category k makes F most 
probable. For example, a new object with many features of a ‘cat’, would be assigned 
to the category of cats, since the feature structure of the object is most probable given 
this category membership.  
 We implemented the continuous version of the rational model, which assumes 
that stimuli are represented in terms of continuous dimensions (for more details see 
Anderson, 1991; Anderson & Matessa, 1992). The continuous version allows the most 
direct comparison with the unsupervised GCM, since the latter also assumes 
continuous dimensions. In the rational model, the probability of classification of a 
novel instance into category k depends on the product )|()( kFPkP . P(k) is given by 
equation (3a):  
cnc
cn
kP k


)1(
)(
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In equation (3a), nk is the number of stimuli assigned to category k so far, n is the total 
number of classified stimuli, and c is a coupling parameter. The coupling parameter 
determines how likely it is that a new instance will be assigned to a new category. 
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Thus, c indirectly determines the number of categories that the rational model will 
produce for a stimulus set. The probability that the new object comes from a new 
category is given by 
cnc
c
P



)1(
1
)0( . )|( kFP is computed as in equation (3b): 
 
i
i kxfkFP )|()|(
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 where i indexes the different dimensions of variation of the stimuli and x indicates 
the different values dimension i can take. That is, )|( kxf i  is the probability of 
displaying value x on dimension i in category k, and is approximated by 
)/11,( iiiait   , which is the t distribution with ai degrees of freedom. i and 
2
i are given by equations (3c) and (3d).  
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-3d- is the variance for classifying into the i dimension. This tells us how much it 
‘matters’ whether a stimulus has a particular value on dimension i or not, for 
classification into a particular category. 
 
In these equations, ni  0 , ni  0 , n is the number of observations in 
category k, y  is their mean along dimension i, and s2 is their variance. Finally, 
00 1   , 0  is the halfway point of the range of all instances and 0  is the square 
of a quarter of the range (Anderson, personal communication).  
It is possible to introduce a dimensional weighting mechanism in the rational 
model. In equation (3b), assume that the probability of having particular values along 
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each dimension is weighted by w1, w2 etc., to indicate the relative importance of the 
dimensions in classifying a new item. In other words,          
        
  
         The question is what kind of weighting scheme is going to be optimal for 
the rational model. Taking logs in the above equation, we have:                
                        
       Suppose that                        . Then, 
clearly, the weight combination which maximizes        is w1=0, w2=1. In other 
words, in the rational model, optimal dimensional weighting corresponds to assigning 
a weight of 1 to the most useful dimension and a weight of 0 to all the other 
dimensions (so that, in contrast to the GCM, graded weighting is never optimal for the 
rational model). Therefore, in the simulations below, where we refer to the ‘rational 
model with dimensional selection’, we assess the probabilities for the predicted 
classifications along all one-dimensional projections.  
 Note that the standard rational model can compute the probability for a 
classification, given a particular order of the items. However, all the empirical 
examples below assume concurrent presentation of the stimuli. Sanborn, Griffiths, 
and Navarro (2006) provided algorithms for the rational model, which approximate 
classification probabilities from the rational model, as if all items had been presented 
concurrently. Sanborn et al.’s examination of their algorithms was shown to both have 
desirable normative properties and outperform the standard rational model in specific 
empirical cases. Specifically, we used the Gibbs sampler algorithm to compute the 
probability for the most probable classification for a stimulus set. Moreover, we 
adapted the algorithm to compute the probability of any particular classification (not 
necessarily the most probable one) for a stimulus set. In either case, higher 
probabilities indicate that the corresponding classifications should be more intuitive.  
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Simplicity model  
The simplicity model of unsupervised categorization (Pothos & Chater, 2002, 2005; 
Pothos & Close, 2008) differs from the rational model and the unsupervised GCM in 
a number of interesting ways. First, the simplicity model is non-metric (a metric space 
is not assumed), while this is not the case for the other two models. Second, the 
simplicity model has no free parameters, a characteristic which contrasts most sharply 
with the unsupervised GCM. Third, the simplicity model aims to maximize within 
category similarity and minimize between category similarity, but only the former 
constraint is relevant to the unsupervised GCM. Finally, the simplicity model is 
currently the only model which has been applied to data from entirely unconstrained 
categorization procedures; it is therefore interesting to compare it with the rational 
model and the unsupervised GCM against such data.  
 According to the simplicity model, more intuitive categories are ones that 
maximize within category similarity and minimize between category similarity (cf. 
Rosch and Mervis, 1975). The model is specified within a computational framework 
based on the simplicity principle (Chater, 1996, 1999). The first step is to compute the 
information content of the similarity structure of a set of items without categories. 
This is done by assuming that every pair of stimuli is compared with every other pair. 
For example, suppose that we have four stimuli, labeled by 1,2,3,4. Then, similarity 
information would be encoded as similarity(1,2)>similarity(1,3), 
similarity(1,2)<similarity(1,4), etc., with each comparison requiring one bit of 
information to specify whether the first pair is more similar or less similar than the 
second (assuming no exact equalities).  
Categories are defined as imposing constraints on the similarity relations 
between pairs of stimuli; similarities within categories are assumed to be greater than 
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all similarities between categories. For example, suppose that we decide to place 
stimuli 1,2 in one category and stimuli 3,4 in a different category. Then, our definition 
of categories implies that similarity(1,2)>{similarity(1,3), similarity(1,4)} and that 
similarity(3,4)>{similarity(1,3), similarity(1,4)}. Thus, the codelength for the 
similarity structure for a set of stimuli can be reduced by using categories, if the 
constraints specified by the categories are numerous and, generally, correct (note that 
equalities in similarity relations do not falsify the constraints; Hines, Pothos, & 
Chater, 2007). If in u constraints there are e incorrect ones, the number of bits of 
information required to correct the errors is given by equation (2a).  
  
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Moreover, we have to take into account the information-theoretic cost of specifying a 
particular category structure of n categories for r objects, which is given by 
)),((log2 nrPart , where Part(r,n) is given by equation (2b).  
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Overall, there is a codelength without categories and a codelength with categories. 
The ratio of the latter to the former indicates how much codelength reduction is 
afforded by the use of categories; it is typically reported as a percentage and referred 
to as just ‘codelength’. The lower its value, the more intuitive a particular category 
structure is predicted to be. The lowest possible value of codelength is about 50%. 
When trying to identify the most intuitive classification from scratch, the simplicity 
model employs a search algorithm akin to those in agglomerative clustering 
procedures (Hines et al., 2007).  
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Analyses  
Our analyses are divided in three parts. First, all three models are examined with a 
simple toy stimulus set. For the rational model and the simplicity model, this exercise 
illustrates the way they are applied and some basic implementational assumptions. 
Regarding the unsupervised GCM, this exercise is more important, since it 
corresponds to a preliminary test of whether the model can capture some obvious 
intuitions about category intuitiveness. Second, we examined a range of classic 
stimulus sets from the supervised categorization literature, on the assumption that 
category learnability is related to intuitiveness. Third, we considered data from studies 
which employed an entirely unsupervised categorization procedure.  
Toy stimulus set/ illustration of the models’ operation 
Four stimulus sets were created to assess the three models with respect to the 
straightforward intuition that well-separated, coherent categories should be more 
intuitive than less-separated ones. Each stimulus set was intended to correspond to a 
category structure composed of two clusters. The stimulus sets differed on how close 
the two clusters were to each other, with category prototypes being 2, 3, 4, or 5 units 
apart. The two most extreme stimulus sets are shown in Figure 2; the other stimulus 
sets were in between these extremes.  
 Unsupervised GCM intuitiveness values were obtained as log likelihood error 
terms, which reflect the deviance between the intended assignment of stimuli into 
categories and the predicted assignment by the GCM. A lower error term implies that 
the corresponding classification is considered more intuitive. Constrained 
optimization of the GCM parameters was done with the fmincon Matlab function 
(version R2007b). We examined the log likelihood error term for a particular 
classification at least 50 times using different random initial parameter values (the 
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lowest error term was taken to be the intuitiveness value from the unsupervised 
GCM). To facilitate comparisons with other models, we normalized the log likelihood 
values for all category structures onto a 0-1 scale (with 0 corresponding to least 
predicted intuitiveness and 1 corresponding to the greatest intuitiveness), through the 
transformation 
minmax
min
1



X
, where X is the log likelihood error for any of the four 
category structures, min is the least log likelihood error (of these four values), and 
max is the greatest error. By carrying out this (or analogous) transformation for the 
predictions from all models, we can derive an impression of how the models compare 
with each other. The normalized scores have been used in all figures, raw model 
predictions in the tables.  
Simplicity model predictions were given as codelength values, so that a lower 
codelength indicates a more intuitive classification. Codelength values typically range 
between 50% and 100%. Recall that the input to the simplicity model is not item 
coordinates, but rather information of which pairs of similarities are greater or smaller 
than others. In order to derive such information from item coordinates, a distance 
metric has to be assumed. Consistently with previous examinations of the simplicity 
model (e.g., Pothos & Chater, 2002, 2005), we opted for the Euclidean metric. The 
Euclidean metric is an appropriate default choice, since it corresponds better to the 
way physical distances are perceived psychologically. Of the models considered, the 
simplicity model was the most straightforward to run, requiring less than a minute per 
stimulus set. Simplicity values were transformed onto a 0-1 scale as above.  
Using Sanborn et al.’s (2006) adaptation of the rational model, it is possible to 
identify the best classification for a set of items and compute the probability for any 
particular classification—as noted, these probabilities can be interpreted as 
predictions for category intuitiveness. The algorithm was run with a different number 
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of iterations for different stimulus sets (at least 10,000), with a view to ensure that not 
more than 10 hours were required per stimulus set. Sample spacing was set to 20. For 
the coupling parameter we employed the commonly used value of 0.5. Finally, for the 
rational model with dimensional selection, intuitiveness values corresponded to the 
most probable classification regardless of whether all dimensions or a particular 
dimension were employed.  
 All models correctly predicted that category structures for which the two 
categories are closer together should be less intuitive, compared to category structures 
for which the categories are further apart (Table 1). This is hardly an exciting 
prediction, but nonetheless an important basic test that the models are consistent with 
expectations in such an intuitive case. Note that the rational model with dimensional 
selection correctly predicts that the optimal dimension in all cases is dimension 1 (in 
other words, the probability of the best possible classification along dimension 1 is 
greater than the corresponding probability along either dimension 2 or both 
dimensions). In this straightforward case, there is agreement between the rational 
model and the rational model with dimensional selection. Regarding the simplicity 
model, the lowest possible codelength in this case is 51.6; as noted, the exact value 
will somewhat depend on the particular classification. Also, the worst possible 
codelength is 117.9, well over 100. This reflects the fact that when the prototypes are 
only two units apart, the costs associated with correcting errors in the constraints 
specified by the classification are so high, that we are actually better off describing 
the similarity information without categories.  
 The behavior of the models can be seen in Figure 3, where each of the model 
measures has been transformed on a 0 to 1 scale. While such a transformation 
involves some arbitrary assumptions, it provides a visually intuitive means of quickly 
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appreciating model similarities and differences (in this case, for example, the fact that 
the unsupervised GCM and the simplicity model rise quickly to their highest value, 
while the rational model’s rise is more gradual).  
--------------------------------------FIGURES 2,3, TABLE 1----------------------------------- 
Supervised categorization data 
Supervised categorization data can be used to derive estimates of category 
intuitiveness in two ways. First, we assume that if classification A is more difficult to 
learn than classification B, then, in an unsupervised context, classification A will be 
considered more intuitive compared to B. The empirical evidence supports this 
assumption. Colreavy and Lewandowsky (in press) found no difference between a 
supervised categorization condition and a matched unsupervised one, in terms of 
strategy development and rate of learning (see also Griffiths, Christian, & Kalish, 
2008). Love (2002) reached the opposite conclusion, but his supervised and 
unsupervised stimulus sets were not directly comparable, and the learning task was 
not entirely equivalent to an unsupervised categorization one.  
 Second, consider categories A and B and a new instance X. Suppose that 
participants are more likely to classify X into category A than B. Since participants 
classified X with category {A} rather than {B}, they must think that the overall 
grouping {A,X}{B} must be more intuitive than the alternative grouping {A}{B,X}. 
Therefore, we can assume that classification {A,X}{B} is more intuitive than 
{A}{B,X}. We can then examine whether the unsupervised categorization models 
consider{A,X}{B} as more intuitive compared to {A}{B,X}. Note that the 
application of the unsupervised GCM to such data is very different from the standard 
application of the GCM, where the objective is to predict classification probabilities 
for the new instances. 
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 Finally, methodologically, one can ask whether the categories employed in 
supervised categorization research may be so unstructured that they would never be 
created in a spontaneous fashion. But, this is not a problem since the difference in 
relative intuitiveness between two classifications, however unstructured, can always 
be empirically examined: participants’ spontaneous classifications should be more 
similar to the one which is predicted to be more intuitive. 
Shepard, Hovland, and Jenkins (1961). Shepard et al. (1961) considered the 
difficulty of learning six binary classifications with stimuli made of three binary 
dimensions (Table 2). Classification 1 is simple to learn because it covaries perfectly 
with the first dimension of the stimuli. Classification 2 reflects an ‘exclusive OR’ 
(non linear) category structure in its first two dimensions, while the third dimension 
constitutes random noise. Classifications 3, 4, and 5 can be described by one-
dimensional rules with exceptions and require attention to all three dimensions. 
Classification 6 also requires attention to all three dimensions, but in this case there 
are no obvious regularities. Shepard et al. reported that the cumulative error rate 
conforms to the following ordering: Classification 1 (easiest) < Classification 2 < 
{Classifications 3, 4, 5} < Classification 6 (most difficult). This result has become a 
benchmark for assessing models of supervised categorization (e.g., Love et al., 2004; 
Kurtz, 2007; Nosofsky & Palmeri, 1996).  
--------------------------------------TABLES 2, 3, FIGURE 4---------------------------------- 
 As discussed, we assumed that more intuitive classifications should be easier 
to learn (the results of Griffiths et al., 2008, support this assumption in the case of the 
Shepard et al. data, with a kind of unsupervised induction task). The unsupervised 
GCM, the simplicity model, and the rational model were applied by computing the 
log likelihoods, codelength values, and classification probabilities, respectively. The 
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raw results are shown in Table 3 and normalized predicted intuitiveness scores are 
shown in Figure 4. The unsupervised GCM performed better than both the simplicity 
model and the rational model. The unsupervised GCM correctly predicted that 
Classifications 1, 2 should be the most intuitive, 3,4,5 of intermediate intuitiveness, 
and, finally, that Classification 6 should be the least intuitive. Note that 
Classifications 1 and 2 are not distinguished (the former should be more intuitive than 
the latter). The simplicity model considered all classifications highly unintuitive; the 
codelength values produced were very close to 100, predicting that participants 
receiving these stimulus sets would be unlikely to spontaneously produce the Shepard 
et al. classifications. The model does predict that Classification 1 should be the most 
intuitive and Classification 6 the least intuitive one. However, the simplicity model 
was confused by Classification 2, which was predicted to be less intuitive than 3,4,5. 
The rational model had a similar problem: as with the simplicity model, the rational 
model correctly predicted Classifications 1 and 6 to be the most and least intuitive, 
respectively; however, it incorrectly predicted Classification 2 to be less intuitive than 
Classifications 3,4,5. The same pattern of results was predicted by the rational model 
with dimensional selection, even though the optimal dimension varied in different 
cases. To sum up, with the Shepard et al. data, the unsupervised GCM outperformed 
the models of unsupervised categorization.   
5-4 category structure. The 5-4 category structure (Medin & Schaffer, 1978) has been 
extensively explored in the context of the debate between prototype and exemplar 
theory (e.g., Johansen & Kruschke, 2005; Nosofsky, 2000; Smith & Minda, 2000; but 
see Homa, Proulx, & Blair, 2008). Medin and Schaffer (1978) reported classification 
probabilities for seven test items (Table 4) and, as discussed, we can use these 
probabilities to infer the intuitiveness of different classifications. For each 
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categorization model, two computations were made for each test item: One with the 
test item assigned to the first category and another with the test item assigned to the 
second category. These two computations corresponded to two intuitiveness values 
for each item. The difference between these two values should correspond to the 
classification probabilities reported by Medin and Schaffer (1978).  
--------------------------------------TABLES 4, 5, FIGURE 5---------------------------------- 
 The results are shown in Table 5 and Figure 5. To create Figure 5, for the 
unsupervised GCM we computed the difference in log likelihood error for the 
classification when the first test item was assigned to the first category minus the log 
likelihood error for the classification when the first test item was assigned to the 
second category; and likewise for the other test items. (In other words, we subtracted 
the values in each of the cells in Table 5.) Subsequently, these differences were 
converted onto a uniform scale, as in the other examples (in this case, the scale was 
0—2; model predictions corresponded to differences between two intuitiveness 
values, and such differences could be negative). An analogous procedure was adopted 
for the other models. Correlating classification probabilities and the differences in 
predicted intuitiveness values, for the unsupervised GCM, the simplicity model, the 
rational model, and the rational model with dimensional selection respectively, we 
obtained: -.857, -.960, .068, -.412. Note that a negative correlation is in the predicted 
direction for the unsupervised GCM and the simplicity model, since for these models 
lower values (lower error or lower codelength) correspond to more intuitive 
classifications and, hence, should be associated with higher classification probabilities 
in Medin and Schaffer’s data. The GCM and the simplicity model competently 
describe the Medin and Schaffer (1978) data; however, the rational model had 
difficulty discriminating between the (assumed) less and more obvious classifications.  
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Linear separability. A classification is linearly separable if a straight line (or the 
equivalent in more than two dimensions), can divide all the items which belong to one 
category from all items which belong to another. Linear separability is an important 
consideration in categorization, since exemplar theory is consistent with non-linearly 
separable categories, but this is not the case for prototype theory. The empirical 
results have been somewhat ambiguous (Ashby & Maddox, 1992; Kalish, 
Lewandowsky, & Kruschke, 2004; Kemler Nelson, 1984; Kemler Nelson, 1984; 
Olsson, Enkvist, & Juslin, 2006; Medin & Schwanenflugel, 1981; Ruts, Storms, & 
Hampton, 2004; Shepard et al., 1961; Smith, Murray, & Minda, 1997; Wattenmaker, 
1995). The latest research with schematic stimuli indicates that linearly separable 
categories are more intuitive (Blair & Homa, 2001). Of the category structures Blair 
and Homa used, most relevant are the ones with four categories each, in which each 
category had nine points (these were the largest stimulus sets). The linearly separable 
category structure was referred to by Blair and Homa as LS9 and the non-linearly 
separable one as NLS9. Blair and Homa reported an advantage of the LS9 
classification relative to the NLS9 one, in terms of ease of learning.  
 We modeled the LS9 vs. NLS9 contrast reported by Blair and Homa (2001). 
Each LS9 category was based around a prototype and nine ‘high distortion’ items 
from the prototype. Each NLS9 category was based around the same prototypes, six 
‘low distortion’ items from the prototype, and one low distortion item from each of 
the other three prototypes (the items from the other prototypes result in non-linearity). 
Blair and Homa reported the coordinates of six items from each prototype in three 
dimensions, which were derived from similarity ratings (Blair, personal 
communication). To approximate the Blair and Homa stimulus sets, the coordinates of 
the six items from each prototype were averaged to infer the coordinates of the 
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prototype. Then, we computed the average distance between the prototypes and 
low/high distortion items, and so created enough low/high distortion items to 
approximate the LS9 and NLS9 category structures (Appendix). We created two more 
extreme stimulus sets, referred to as LS9X and NLS9X, in which the prototype 
coordinates were changed so that the least distance between any two prototypes would 
be at least 1.5 times the distance between a prototype and a high distortion item. The 
LS9, NLS9 stimulus sets can only be said to approximate the actual Blair and Homa 
stimulus sets. Therefore, we examined linear separability of each stimulus set with a 
series of logistic regressions attempting to predict category membership (Ruts et al., 
2004). Our re-creation of LS9 is not linearly separable (probably because categories 
are too close to each other), but it is a lot more so compared to NLS9. Moreover, the 
new stimulus set LS9X is linearly separable.  
--------------------------------------TABLE 6, FIGURE 6---------------------------------- 
The empirical finding we aimed to model was that LS9 was easier to learn 
compared to NLS9. Although there are no relevant empirical results for LS9X and 
NLS9X, we tentatively assume that for LS9X increasing the distance between 
category prototypes would make a category structure more salient (a straightforward 
assumption), but this would not be the case for NLS9X (a more controversial 
assumption). The results are shown in Table 6 and Figure 6. The unsupervised GCM 
and the simplicity model successfully predicted a difference between LS9 and NLS9 
and a more pronounced difference between LS9X and NLS9X. Note that using the 
unsupervised GCM to predict category intuitiveness is a different computation from 
that corresponding to the standard GCM and, so, our results do not bear on the fact 
that Blair and Homa (2001) could not identify satisfactory (standard) GCM fits for the 
classification probabilities of their test items. According to the rational model, all 
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classifications were extremely unlikely, and maybe this obscured any finer differences 
due to linear separability.  
Unsupervised categorization data 
Compton & Logan (1999). Compton and Logan (1999) reported extensive data on 
judgments of category intuitiveness, in an entirely unsupervised categorization task. 
They presented participants with diagrams of dots, as in Figure 1 (but without any 
curves), and asked participants to classify the dots in a way that seemed immediately 
natural and intuitive, by drawing curves to indicate their groupings. There were no 
constraints at all as to how the items should be classified (including no constraints on 
the number of groups; cf. Murphy, 2004). Compton and Logan measured category 
intuitiveness in terms of classification variability, that is, the number of unique 
classifications for each diagram shown to participants, so as to examine whether 
classification variability changed when the arrangement of dots in a diagram was 
transformed (e.g., reflected or rotated). Compton and Logan employed 48 unique 
diagrams, which consisted of 12 examples for each numerosity of dots from 7 to 10, 
inclusive (each participant classified 144 diagrams, the 48 original ones and various 
transformations of them). Each unique diagram was created by randomly arranging 
the appropriate number of dots in a 40x40 grid.  
 The categorization procedure of Compton and Logan somewhat deviates from 
the standard procedure in unsupervised categorization experiments: participants drew 
lines around points, instead of classifying stimuli as separate entities. For example, 
the classification of dots in a diagram will be affected by the nearest neighbor 
structure in the diagram; participants would rarely classify in the same cluster dots 
which are far away from each other. By contrast, in standard unsupervised 
classification tasks, where participants receive stimuli as separate entities, 
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classification of highly dissimilar items into the same group is sometimes observed. 
However, Compton and Logan (1999) is currently the most extensive report of 
unsupervised categorization results. Moreover, perceptual grouping processes in 
Compton and Logan’s experiment is arguably very similar to the grouping by 
similarity, postulated by models such as simplicity and the GCM: in both cases, the 
assumption is that participants will prefer groupings which enhance within category 
similarity. Finally, some researchers have argued that such dot diagrams is a valid 
way to study unsupervised categorization (Pothos & Chater, 2002).  
Compton and Logan only reported the diagrams for which they observed the 
two highest and two lowest classification variability values in each of their two 
experiments; we read off the item coordinates from the diagrams (Appendix), so as to 
examine whether the predictions of the unsupervised categorization models are 
consistent with the highest/ lowest classification variability results reported by 
Compton and Logan: there should be less classification variability for stimulus sets 
for which the models can identify more intuitive classifications.  
--------------------------------------TABLE 7, FIGURE 7--------------------------------- 
 The simplicity model and the rational model can identify the best possible 
classification for a set of items. In the case of the simplicity model, we employed the 
agglomerative search algorithm described in Pothos and Chater (2002) and for the 
rational model the Gibbs sampler algorithm in Sanborn et al. (2006), which computes 
the most probable classification for a set of items, in a way that approximates 
concurrent presentation of the items.  
Regarding the unsupervised GCM, we have no algorithm to identify the 
preferred classification from scratch. Therefore, we examined the log likelihood error 
term for the preferred classifications identified by the simplicity model, the rational 
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model with dimensional selection, and K-means two- and three-cluster algorithms 
(excluding some all-inclusive categories identified by the rational model, since such 
categories are pathological for the unsupervised GCM); the intuitiveness prediction 
from the GCM for a stimulus set corresponded to the lowest identified log likelihood 
error term overall. In this case, we also examined a modification for the unsupervised 
GCM, for which the sensitivity parameter was fixed to a constant value (we chose 
c=0.5, noting that which value of c is suitable will depend on the coordinate units). 
Why is this consideration relevant in this case, but not in the case of the stimulus sets 
from supervised categorization studies? In unsupervised research, the classifications 
considered are typically chosen to be intuitive to naïve observers. Accordingly, 
without a restriction on c, the GCM can always stretch the representational space in 
such a way that the corresponding classification is maximally intuitive. 
Psychologically, by restricting the sensitivity parameter, we suggest that participants 
spontaneously classify an item not just by considering its single nearest neighbor, but 
in relation to many of the other items as well (this seems highly plausible in the case 
of the Compton & Logan results, and also the Pothos & Chater results, considered 
next).  
The results are shown in Table 7 and Figure 7. Note first that the standard 
unsupervised GCM is unable to discriminate between the intuitive and unintuitive 
stimulus set, but this is not so when a restriction in the sensitivity parameter is 
introduced.  We next correlated the classification variability results reported by 
Compton and Logan with the intuitiveness values generated from each model. These 
(Pearson) correlations were for the unsupervised GCM, .319, the unsupervised GCM 
with a c restriction, .407, the simplicity model, .430, the rational model, -.032, and the 
rational model with dimensional selection, -.902 (all in the right direction, noting that 
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higher values from the unsupervised GCM and the simplicity model correspond to 
less intuitive categories, but higher values from the rational model to more intuitive 
categories). Of these correlations, the one involving the rational model with 
dimensional selection probabilities was the highest, showing that allowing 
dimensional selection in the rational model is a key modification regarding the 
model’s explanatory power. Moreover, the unsupervised GCM with c restricted 
performs better than the unrestricted GCM. Specifically, it correctly identifies the four 
low variability stimulus sets as more intuitive than all the four high variability ones.  
Pothos and Chater (2002). Pothos and Chater examined four 10-item stimulus sets 
for which there were differing intuitions about the most intuitive classification 
(Appendix). In the first one, there were two well-separated clusters of equal size 
(referred to as ‘two clusters’). In the second one, there were also two well-separated 
clusters, but one was larger than the other (referred to as ‘big small’). In the third 
stimulus set there were three well-separated clusters (‘three clusters’). Finally, there 
was little classification structure in the last stimulus set (referred to as ‘little’).  
 We consider Experiment 2 of Pothos and Chater, whereby item coordinates 
were mapped onto (separable) dimensions of physical variations, to create stimulus 
pictures that were printed on separate sheets of paper and given to participants to be 
sorted into groups that were “intuitive and natural”. No constraints were imposed on 
participants’ classifications (e.g., participants could use as many clusters as they liked, 
they could see the stimuli in any order or way they liked, and they could make 
changes in their classifications). This represents the most naturalistic unsupervised 
categorization study we found in the published literature. Pothos and Chater employed 
28 participants and measured classification performance in terms of three indices, the 
number of distinct classifications (a higher value implies less participant agreement), 
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the number of robust distinct classifications (these are the distinct classifications with 
a frequency greater than one), and the frequency with which the best possible 
classification was produced. Because of the small sample, these three measures did 
not correlate very well with each other; Pothos and Chater considered the last two as 
the most valid. We derived two separate rank orderings for the four stimulus sets from 
these two measures, which we subsequently added together to obtain an overall rank 
ordering for the observed intuitiveness of different stimulus sets. For the ‘two 
clusters’, ‘big, small’, ‘three clusters’, and ‘little’ stimulus sets, the summation of the 
ranks for these two measures produced 3, 2, 5, and 7 respectively, whereby a lower 
number indicates higher category intuitiveness.   
--------------------------------------TABLE 8, FIGURE 8---------------------------- 
 Unsupervised GCM category intuitiveness predictions were computed for the 
classifications predicted by the simplicity model, the rational model with dimensional 
selection, and K-means two-cluster and three-cluster algorithms. As before, we 
explored the version of the unsupervised GCM with and without restricting the 
sensitivity parameter; for the rational model we employed the Sanborn et al. (2006) 
algorithms. The simplicity model was applied to the stimulus sets by searching for the 
best possible classification on the basis of item coordinates. The results are shown in 
Table 8 and Figure 8. The simplicity model and the restricted unsupervised GCM 
accurately predicted the ordinal ordering of empirical classification intuitiveness in 
Table 8, but this was not the case for the unrestricted unsupervised GCM (which 
failed to discriminate between any of the stimulus sets). Finally, the rational model 
with dimensional selection was in much closer correspondence to the empirical results 
than the standard version. 
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Conclusions 
Naïve observers can often have very compelling intuitions that a particular grouping 
for a set of stimuli may be more appropriate than another. Therefore, understanding 
the computational basis for such intuitions appears an important objective for models 
of unsupervised categorization. One aim of this paper was to examine predictions 
about category intuitiveness, from computational models of categorization, against a 
series of studies from the categorization literature.  
 Models of unsupervised categorization which can readily produce a measure 
of category intuitiveness are the rational model and the simplicity model and so these 
two models were tested in our analyses. Future work could fruitfully include 
additional models, such as Schyns’ (1991) self-organizing neural network, which was 
used to model category emergence, Compton and Logan’s (1993, 1999) perceptual 
grouping approach to unsupervised categorization, or Love et al.’s (2004; Gureckis & 
Love, 2002) SUSTAIN model, which assumes two slightly separate mechanisms for 
supervised and unsupervised categorization (respectively, an explicit error term and 
surprisingness with a principle of similarity). Finally, there has been an extensive 
literature on statistical clustering (e.g., Fisher and Langley, 1990; Krzanowski & 
Marriott, 1995), which looks relevant to studies of unsupervised categorization. Such 
models could serve as psychological models of categorization, after some additional 
theoretical elaboration.  
 Another aim of this paper was to explore the possibility that a measure of 
category intuitiveness could be derived from a supervised model of categorization, the 
GCM. In our adaptation of the GCM, a candidate classification for a set of items is 
examined by considering how well the intended classification of each item can be 
predicted on the basis of all the other items. A log likelihood error term can thus be 
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computed, which indicates the ability of the GCM to describe the candidate 
assignment of items to categories. We postulated that when this error term is lower, 
then the corresponding classification is more consistent with the assumptions of the 
GCM about categorization, so that such a classification would be predicted (by the 
GCM) to be more psychologically intuitive. Both the supervised and unsupervised 
GCM are based on exactly the same equations, but are applied differently. The 
unsupervised GCM computes a number which can be interpreted as category 
intuitiveness, while the supervised GCM predicts classification probabilities for novel 
instances. Crucially, in the unsupervised GCM no parameter fitting is taking place 
relative to empirical data (parameters are searched so as to identify the best possible 
classification for a set of stimuli), while in the supervised GCM parameters are 
specified so as to achieve particular probabilities for the classification of new 
instances. 
The unsupervised GCM favors groupings of items that maximize within 
category similarity. The crucial difference between the unsupervised GCM and 
models such as the simplicity one is that similarity groupings are assessed not just 
against the initial/ unprocessed dimensional representation of the items, but against all 
possible derivative representations, which would be forthcoming from dimensional 
weighting, stretching/ compression of psychological space etc. This representational 
flexibility is, of course, the hallmark of GCM predictions and its characteristic which 
has allowed it to provide impressive fits to empirical data. It is also a characteristic 
that has provoked some criticism since, if the GCM is proved to be too flexible, then 
its explanatory power would be limited. Accordingly, a possible way in which our 
demonstration could have failed would be if the unsupervised GCM could predict 
every arbitrary assignment of items into categories to be perfectly intuitive. However, 
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this was not the case, and the accuracy of the predictions from the unsupervised GCM 
compared favorably from those of the rational model and the simplicity model.  
One can ask whether the unsupervised GCM is meant to be understood as a 
full model of unsupervised categorization. For a full model of unsupervised 
categorization what is needed is a criterion of category intuitiveness and a search 
algorithm which can use this criterion to identify the optimal classification for a set of 
stimuli from scratch. The unsupervised GCM fulfills only the first requirement. It can 
be used to compute the predicted category intuitiveness for a stimulus set, a prediction 
which can be compared with the ones from the rational model and the simplicity 
model. However, the current formulation of the unsupervised GCM fails the second 
requirement. To appreciate why this is the case, consider first how the simplicity 
model (equally for the rational model) works. The simplicity model can easily 
identify the predicted most intuitive classification for a set of stimuli from scratch, 
with simple search algorithms which take the stimulus configuration and identify the 
classification which best optimizes the model’s criterion for category intuitiveness. 
For the unsupervised GCM, the problem is that there is no single stimulus 
configuration, but rather an infinite number of possible ones, defined by stretching/ 
compressing psychological space or different relative attentional weighting of the 
item dimensions (in other words, the situation is like having different stimulus sets, 
the original one and all possible transformations of the original one, as allowed by the 
GCM parameters). Thus, in the case of the unsupervised GCM the search space is 
much more extensive, making optimization of its criterion for category intuitiveness 
intensive and difficult (so that, for example, the straightforward agglomerative 
algorithm which works for the simplicity model will not work for the unsupervised 
GCM). With future work, we hope to address this difficulty. 
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Regarding the results of our simulations, all models performed reasonably 
well, but no model could be identified as clearly superior when compared to the 
others. More work needs to be done in order to model category intuitiveness in a 
satisfactory way. For example, with the Shepard, Hovland, Jenkins (1961) data, the 
unsupervised GCM performed better than both the simplicity model and the rational 
model. In the case of the 5-4 category structure (Medin & Schaffer, 1978), the 
simplicity model came out ahead, with the unsupervised GCM providing the second 
best fit. In the case of comparing Blair and Homa’s (2001) LS/ NLS category 
structures, the simplicity model and the unsupervised GCM could both provide a 
perfect account of the empirical findings. Compton and Logan (1999) provided one of 
the early studies with an entirely unsupervised categorization procedure. The best 
description for their results was from the rational model with dimensional selection. 
The unrestricted unsupervised GCM was too powerful for this data. It was necessary 
to constrain the sensitivity parameter before the unsupervised GCM could accurately 
predict an intuitiveness difference between the low and high variability stimulus sets 
(cf. Stewart & Brown, 2005; Olsson et al., 2004). Finally, the restricted unsupervised 
GCM and the simplicity model could account for Pothos and Chater’s (2002) data, 
and the results from the rational model with dimensional selection were in close 
correspondence too.  
The relative success of the unsupervised GCM calls into question the 
distinction between supervised and unsupervised categorization which has dominated 
the literature. We showed that a model of supervised categorization could be 
straightforwardly adapted to make predictions about category intuitiveness. Also, the 
converse situation is implied in our demonstration: models of unsupervised 
categorization were used to describe empirical results from supervised categorization 
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studies, by assuming that when a classification is more difficult to learn then it should 
be less intuitive (cf. Colreavy and Lewandowsky, in press). It is therefore possible 
that both supervised and unsupervised categorization could be described within the 
same mathematical framework (e.g., the GCM), noting, however, that behavioral or 
neuroscience data may show these to correspond to distinct psychological processes 
(e.g., cf.  Ashby & Ell, 2002; Ashby & Perrin, 1988; Nomura et al., 2007; Zeithamova 
& Maddox, 2006; see also Love et al., 2004). Future work will hopefully address 
these exciting issues, as well as extend formalisms like the rational model and the 
simplicity model to provide more complete fits to category intuitiveness data.  
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Appendix. Coordinates of stimulus sets for Blair and Homa (2001), Compton and 
Logan (2001), and Pothos and Chater (2002).  
 
The coordinates for the LS9 and NLS9 category structures, after Blair and Homa 
(2001).   
 
LS9 
dim1  dim2  dim3 category membership 
0.512577 -0.79309 0.599944 1 
0.950823 -0.43238 -0.64205 1 
0.919654 -0.21622 0.84206 1 
0.568712 -0.39062 0.806167 1 
0.880188 -1.05977 0.25976 1 
0.870623 -0.12556 0.828048 1 
0.582638 -0.79996 -0.43682 1 
0.803067 -0.30819 -0.65991 1 
0.876774 -0.58663 -0.61081 1 
-0.37315 0.377606 -0.70526 2 
-0.73816 0.51154 0.740735 2 
-1.0016 -0.22806 -0.23997 2 
-1.16004 0.355098 0.491137 2 
-0.89618 0.516986 0.680177 2 
-0.47673 1.029432 -0.24724 2 
-0.12914 -0.00409 -0.49905 2 
0.135353 0.036625 0.084978 2 
-0.9625 0.412114 0.664558 2 
-0.94764 -0.07662 -0.57309 3 
-0.16205 0.250033 -1.35296 3 
-0.19715 -0.36733 -1.42623 3 
0.12512 0.365261 -0.24335 3 
-0.49901 0.220019 -1.30251 3 
-0.01908 -0.65789 -0.18377 3 
-0.15327 -0.23203 -1.45411 3 
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-0.21237 -0.32686 0.030132 3 
-0.0272 0.535436 -1.00146 3 
-0.00022 0.108769 1.334538 4 
-0.65028 0.589483 0.717457 4 
-0.08156 0.110816 -0.17754 4 
0.1981  -0.19542 -0.05218 4 
-0.48844 -0.4543 0.799656 4 
-0.5698 0.011733 1.129052 4 
-0.12106 0.094234 1.334165 4 
0.522919 0.424834 0.962302 4 
-0.08454 0.180491 1.335545 4 
 
NLS9 
dim1  dim2  dim3 category membership 
0.838829 -0.36053 0.501983 1 
0.461945 -0.17192 0.194231 1 
0.619334 0.015154 0.190737 1 
0.768688 -0.26211 0.495337 1 
0.68267 -0.60588 -0.15475 1 
0.740189 -0.04274 0.380288 1 
-0.27036 0.610669 2.62E-05 1 
-0.15634 -0.11304 -0.30074 1 
-0.36082 0.40637 0.609859 1 
-0.49422 0.210742 -0.35648 2 
-0.93876 0.259376 -0.10888 2 
-0.25408 0.371623 0.289483 2 
-0.27109 0.358076 0.309954 2 
-0.6851 0.26592 -0.35547 2 
-0.60909 0.265358 0.425998 2 
1.088306 -0.11084 0.327542 2 
0.070897 -0.19185 -0.99894 2 
-0.43094 -0.02517 0.646929 2 
-0.00154 0.010836 -0.38427 3 
-0.45214 -0.28763 -0.98939 3 
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-0.21596 -0.50962 -0.53759 3 
-0.36785 -0.23031 -0.34315 3 
-0.21239 0.267929 -0.70358 3 
0.200385 -0.10851 -0.73687 3 
0.47956 -0.19797 -0.07317 3 
-0.54098 0.321569 0.433105 3 
0.320622 0.068017 0.701643 3 
0.335456 0.08753 0.653351 4 
0.160945 -0.04609 0.289989 4 
0.214626 -0.04449 0.339537 4 
-0.15039 0.004641 0.203744 4 
-0.04018 0.27801 0.200659 4 
-0.11774 0.162605 0.177971 4 
0.928562 0.017137 0.298591 4 
-0.55534 0.339004 0.433492 4 
-0.43699 0.087898 -0.94817 4
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The Compton and Logan (1999) stimulus sets for which highest and lowest 
classification variability was observed in Compton and Logan’s Experiments 1 and 2. 
Classification variability is expressed in terms of number of unique classifications 
produced for each dataset, and shown between parentheses for each dataset (this is the 
way to reference the coordinates in Compton and Logan’s diagrams). The horizontal 
and vertical dimensions in Compton and Logan’s diagrams are denoted as ‘x’ and ‘y’.  
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Experiment 1  
Low classification variability (4) 
             x              y 
0 5 
2 9 
8 8 
9 7 
7 2 
9 0 
11 1 
 
Experiment 1 
Low classification variability (6) 
             x             y 
0 5 
5 11 
6 10 
5 2 
8 8 
9 9 
10 9 
 
 
 
 
 
Experiment 2  
Low classification variability (5) 
             x              y 
0 5 
1 10 
4 11 
4 6 
6 4 
7 11 
9 5 
 
Experiment 2  
Low classification variability (5) 
             x                    y 
1 3 
1 1 
3 10 
4 11 
8 9 
8 7 
9 6 
8 5 
9 4 
 
 
Experiment 1  
High classification variability (21) 
             x              y 
0 6 
2 6 
3 0 
5 5 
6 2 
8 7 
7 11 
11 1 
 
Experiment 1  
High classification variability (25) 
             x                     y 
0 9 
5 8 
4 5 
5 1 
8 4 
9 1 
10 2 
10 4 
11 7 
 
Experiment 2  
High classification variability (20) 
                    x              y 
1 5 
2 4 
4 4 
5 10 
7 8 
7 6 
7 4 
10 6 
11 10 
11 1 
Experiment 2  
High classification variability (23) 
             x                    y 
1 8 
2 5 
5 6 
6 3 
6 8 
9 10 
11 9 
10 8 
11 1 
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The coordinates of the four datasets employed by Pothos and Chater (2002). The 
intended horizontal and vertical dimensions are the first and second dimension 
respectively.  
 
Two clusters  
2 2 
2 3 
3 3 
3 2 
3 4 
8 6 
7 7 
8 7 
8 8 
7 9 
 
Big, small 
2 5 
3 5 
3 6 
9 4 
7 4 
8 4 
8 5 
7 5 
8 6 
9 5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Three clusters 
2 3 
3 3 
3 4 
1 2 
6 6 
7 8 
6 7 
8 0 
9 0 
9 1 
 
Little 
5 4 
4 5 
2 5 
2 2 
4 1 
6 1 
7 3 
7 6 
5 8 
3 8
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Tables 
Table 1. The application of the unsupervised GCM, simplicity model, and the rational 
model to the ‘toy’ dataset of Figure 2.  
 
 Distance between prototypes 
Model 2 3 4 5 
Assumed intuitiveness least medium high highest 
GCM
1 
5.97 1.15 0 0 
Simplicity
2 
118 66.9 54.7 51.6 
Rational
3 
    
 all dims 3.07 3.55 4.87  5.99 
 best dim
4
  6.10 15.0 26.0 31.0 
Notes: 
1
Goodness of fit (smaller values predict greater intuitiveness); 
2
Codelength % 
(smaller values predict greater intuitiveness); 
3
Classification probability x 10
-4
 (larger 
values predict greater intuitiveness); 
4
The best dimension was always dimension 1. 
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Table 2. The Shepard, Hovland, and Jenkins (1961) classifications. The stimuli are 
specified in terms of three binary features (feature values: 1, 2). Each stimulus is 
assigned to category A or B, as specified, for each of the six category structures (I-
VI). 
 
 Category structure 
Stimulus I II III IV V VI 
1 1 1 A A B B B B 
1 1 2 A A B B B A 
1 2 1 A B B B B A 
1 2 2 A B A A A B 
2 1 1 B B A B A A 
2 1 2 B B B A A B 
2 2 1 B A A A A B 
2 2 2 B A A A B A 
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Table 3. Predictions of category intuitiveness from the unsupervised GCM, simplicity 
model, and the rational model for the Shepard et al. (1961) classifications.  
 
 
 Classification 
Model I II III IV V VI 
Observed lowest low intermediate intermediate intermediate highest 
GCM
1
 0 0 11.1 11.1 13.1 13.6 
Simplicity
2
 93.9 107.6 103.2 101.1 104 113 
Rational
3
       
 all dims 68 38 53 55 51 31 
 best dim
4 
     
240 
d2 
214 
d1 
227 
d1 
236 
d2 
229 
d2 
192 
d1 
Notes: 
1
Goodness of fit; 
2
Codelength %; 
3
Classification probability x 10
-4
; 
4
The best 
dimension for the rational model with dimensional selection is shown below each 
probability.  
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Table 4. Medin and Schaffer’s (1978) 5-4 dataset and classification probabilities of 
the test items. Items are represented in terms of four binary dimensions (values 0,1).  
 
 
 
Training items  Test items 
Category 1 Category 2  Label Coordinates Probability
1
  
1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0   T1 1 0 0 1 0.59 
1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0  T2 1 0 0 0 0.31 
1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1  T3 1 1 1 1 0.94 
1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0  T4 0 0 1 0 0.34 
0 1 1 1   T5 0 1 0 1 0.50 
   T6 0 0 1 1 0.62 
   T7 0 1 0 0 0.16 
Notes: 
1
This is the probability of classification to Category 1.  
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Table 5. The application of the unsupervised GCM, simplicity model, and the rational model to the Medin and Schaffer (1978) data. The first 
value in each cell corresponds to the intuitiveness of a classification assuming the test item is assigned to the first category, the second number 
assuming that the test item is assigned to the second category.  
 Test items    
Model T3 T6 T1 T5 T4 T2 T7 
Empirical probability
1 
.94 .62 .59 .50 .34 .31 .16 
GCM
2 
5.56 – 15.5 5.99 – 13.5 5.94 – 13.5 14.9 – 8.73 13.4 – 8.75 13.4 – 8.79 15.2 – 8.65 
Simplicity
3 
90.3 – 101 95.8 – 97.5 95.8 – 97.5 98.4 – 94.8 97.8 – 95 97.8 – 95 100 – 90.6 
Rational
4 
       
 all dims 9.5 – 7.5 4.9 – 18 4.9 – 18  4.9 – 18 8.1 – 12 7.8 – 12 8.0 – 12 
 best dim
5
  46 – 74 45 – 76 46 – 74 46 – 76 45 – 74 46 – 73 47 – 73 
     d1/d3 – d4 d3 – d2 d1 – d2 d2 – d4  d3/d4 – d1 d1 – d2 d2 – d1/d3 
Notes: 
1
Empirical probabilities refer to classification into the first category; 
2
Goodness of fit; 
3
Codelength %; 
4
Classification probability x 10
-4
; 
5
The best dimension for classification into Category 1 – the best dimension for classification into Category 2 is shown below each probability 
Where two dimensions are shown, this means that the probability of the best classification along one dimension is the same as that of the other.
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Table 6. Unsupervised GCM, simplicity model, rational model, and rational model 
with dimensional selection predictions for linearly separable (LS9, LS9X) and 
nonlinearly separable (NLS9, NLS9X) category structures, created after Blair and 
Homa (2001).  
 
 Category structure 
Model LS9 LS9X NLS9 NLS9X 
Predicted intuitiveness high highest lowest lowest 
GCM
1 
49.1 1.69 100 100 
Simplicity
2 
91.4 71.3 99.5 98.6 
Rational
3 
    
 all dims 1.96 0.959 2.15  6.72 
 best dim
4
 1.96 17.1 5.96 13.7 
 all d3 d1 d2 
Notes: 
1
Goodness of fit; 
2
Codelength %; 
3
Classification probability x 10
-24
; 
4
The best 
dimension for the rational model with dimensional selection is shown below each 
probability; ‘all’ indicates that no one-dimensional solution was better than the 
solution with all dimensions.  
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Table 7. Unrestricted and restricted unsupervised GCM, simplicity model, rational model, and rational model with dimensional selection, for the 
Compton and Logan (1999) data. Stimulus sets for which the lowest and highest classification variabilities were observed are denoted by ‘L’ and 
‘H’ respectively (there were two stimulus sets of each kind in Compton and Logan’s study).  
 
 Category structure     
Model Exp1 L Exp1 L Exp2 L Exp2 L Exp1 H Exp1 H Exp2 H Exp2 H 
Empirical data
1
 4 6 5 5 21 25 20 23 
GCM
2 
        
    unrestricted 0 0 0 0 4.39 0 0 0 
    restricted (c=0.5) 0.28x10
-4 
4.52x10
-4 
10.9x10
-4 
0.26x10
-4 
10.2 1.24 0.64 0.07 
Simplicity
3 
69.3 53.9 84.7 60.2 87.7 74.6 76.5 71 
Rational
4 
        
 all dims .128 .135 .153  .091 .135 .115 .117 .136 
 best dim
5
 .438 .287 .576 .487 .135 .132 .117 .136 
     d1 d2 d2 d1  all d1 all all 
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Notes: 
1
 This is the number of distinct classifications produced by Compton and Logan’s participants; as there were 30 participants in each of 
their Experiments 1 and 2, the highest possible value for classification variability is 30 (and the lowest possible value one); 
2
Goodness of fit; 
3
Codelength %; 
4
Classification probability; 
5
The best dimension for the rational model  is shown below each probability; ‘all’ indicates that no 
one-dimensional solution was better than the solution with all dimensions. 
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Table 8. Unrestricted and restricted unsupervised GCM, simplicity model, rational 
model, and rational model with dimensional selection predictions for the Pothos and 
Chater (2002) stimulus sets.  
 
 
 Stimulus set 
Model Two clusters Big, small 
cluster 
Three clusters Little 
GCM
1 
    
    unrestricted 0 0 0 0 
    restricted (c=0.5) 0.002 0.002 0.104 4.110 
Simplicity
2 
51.6 51.2 62.3 87.7 
Rational
3 
    
 all dims .640 .082 .083 .144 
 best dim
4
 .752 .671 .360 .144 
     d1 d1 d1 all 
Notes: 
1
Goodness of fit; 
2
Codelength %; 
3
Classification probability; 
4
The best 
dimension for the rational model with dimensional selection is shown below each 
probability; ‘all’ indicates that no one-dimensional solution was better than the 
solution with all dimensions. 
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Figure captions 
 
Figure 1. Each point in the diagram represents an item in psychological space. The top 
panel shows an intuitive category structure, while the bottom one a corresponding less 
intuitive one.  
 
Figure 2. Shown is the most intuitive (left) and least intuitive (right) category 
structure, in a set of four category structures which were used to illustrate the function 
of the models. The distance between the prototypes of the two categories varied 
between five and two units (in decrements of 1 unit). In the right figure, there was a 
point that is identical for categories A and B.  
 
Figure 3. Unsupervised GCM, simplicity, and rational model intuitiveness values for 
the Figure 2 category structures.  
 
Figure 4. Unsupervised GCM, simplicity, and rational model intuitiveness values for 
the six classifications of Shepard et al. (1961). The intuitiveness values from each 
model were converted onto a 0-1 scale.  
 
Figure 5. Unsupervised GCM, simplicity, and rational model intuitiveness values for 
the classification of the seven test items in the 5-4 dataset of Medin and Schaffer 
(1978). The intuitiveness values from each model were converted onto a uniform 
scale (0-2). Also shown are the empirically measured classification probabilities, 
converted onto a 0-2 scale; the results are ordered in terms of decreasing likelihood 
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that the test item would be classified in the second category. The horizontal axis refers 
to the test items (T1-T7).  
 
Figure 6. Unsupervised GCM, simplicity, and rational model intuitiveness values for 
the LS9 and NLS9 category structures of Blair and Homa (2001), as well as two 
derivative category structures in which the prototypes were pushed further apart. The 
intuitiveness values from each model were converted onto a 0-1 scale.  
 
Figure 7. Unsupervised GCM with c=0.5, simplicity model, and rational model with 
dimensional selection intuitiveness values (converted onto a scale between 0 and 1) 
for the Compton and Logan (1999) datasets. The horizontal axis indexes the datasets, 
in the same order as they appear in Table 7. In the graph we also show Compton and 
Logan’s empirical results, converted onto a 0 – 1 scale.  
 
Figure 8. Unsupervised GCM with c=0.5, simplicity model, and rational model with 
dimensional selection intuitiveness values (converted onto a scale between 0 and 1) 
for the Pothos and Chater (2002) datasets. The aggregate empirical measure of 
category intuitiveness from Pothos and Chater’s (2002) results is also shown 
(converted to a 0—1 scale).  
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Figure 4.  
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Figure 5. 
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Figure 6.  
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Figure 7.  
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Figure 8.  
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